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 Reorienting Disclosure Debates in a  
Post- Citizens United World 
 Katherine  Shaw * 
 I.  Introduction 
 Disclosure is often an afterthought in debates about money in politics. 
Reformers have tended to take disclosure for granted, devoting little time to 
developing and refi ning the affi rmative case for it. They have also tended to 
assume that the current disclosure regime is an effective one, at least as far as it 
goes. Reformers  have devoted substantial attention to the holes in the current 
regime in the post- Citizens United era— so- called “dark” and “gray” money 1  — 
and have considered ways to bring such activity into the light. Yet even if they 
are successful, such expansion efforts would only bring more dollars under the 
auspices of a disclosure regime in need of both stronger conceptual architec-
ture and substantial practical improvements. So closing the gaps in the system 
is only one aspect of the task. 
 Consistent with the mission of this volume, this chapter will fi rst survey the 
doctrine, practice, and empirics of disclosure. It will then turn to a number 
of proposals for reforming the reach, quality, and impact of this mode of cam-
paign fi nance regulation. 2  
 *  Katherine Shaw is Professor of Law and Co- Director of the Floersheimer Center for 
Constitutional Democracy at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law at Yeshiva University. 
 1   Chisun  Lee ,  Katherine  Valde ,  Benjamin T.  Brickner &  Douglas  Keith ,  Brennan 
Center for Justice ,  Secret Spending in the States  5  ( Sept.  2016 ) ,  www.brennancenter 
.org/ sites/ default/ fi les/ analysis/ Secret_ Spending_ in_ the_ States.pdf (defi ning dark money as 
“election spending by entities that do not publicly disclose their donors,” and “gray money” as 
spending “by entities that disclose donors in a way that makes the original sources of money 
diffi cult or perhaps impossible to identify.”). 
 2   Many of these proposals are drawn from my previous work with sociologist  Jennifer  Heerwig . 
 Jennifer A.  Heerwig &  Katherine  Shaw ,  Through a Glass, Darkly: The Rhetoric and Reality of 
Campaign Finance Disclosure ,  102  Geo. L.J.  1443 ,  1449 ( 2014 ) . 
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 II.  The Doctrine and Practice of Disclosure 
 A.  Doctrine 
 “Campaign fi nance disclosure” generally refers to laws that require both 
reporting and public dissemination of information about political actors’ 
fundraising and spending. The term can be further divided into a few distinct 
but related activities:  the  reporting of information about contributions and 
expenditures; the public  dissemination of that information; and  disclaimers , 
which provide the public with information about the sponsors of particular 
political messages (“e.g., paid for by the ABC Committee.”) 3  
 Mandatory disclosure has long been a feature of our law of campaign 
fi nance. The Supreme Court’s analytical framework for disclosure is trace-
able, like much in the law of campaign fi nance, to  Buckley v.  Valeo , 4  the 
Court’s foundational consideration of the constitutionality of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act (FECA). 5  
 In addition to upholding FECA ’s contribution limits and invalidating 
the law’s expenditure limits, the  Buckley Court upheld FECA’s disclosure 
requirements in full (though subject to several important limiting principles). 6  
The relevant provisions of law required “political committees” 7  to register with 
the Federal Election Commission (FEC), and to keep records of expenditures 
and contributions. 8  The law also required candidates and political committees 
to provide the FEC with detailed reports, which the FEC would then make 
available “for public inspection and copying.” 9  Beyond its candidate and pol-
itical committee provisions, the law required  all individuals or groups that 
made independent expenditures above a certain amount “for the purpose 
 3   Heerwig & Shaw,  supra  note 2 , at 1449;  Ciara  Torres- Spelliscy ,  Hiding Behind the 
Tax  Code, The Dark Election of 2010 and Why Tax- Exempt Entities Should be Subject 
to Robust Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws ,  16  Chap. J.L. & Pol’y  59 ,  79 
( 2010– 2011 ) . 
 4   Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 5   Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92– 225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972),  amended 
by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93– 443, 88 Stat. 1263 
(codifi ed as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (1974)). 
 6   Buckley , 424 U.S . at 63– 64.  
 7   When  Buckley was decided, FECA defi ned a political committee as “a group of persons that 
receives ‘contributions’ or makes ‘expenditures’ of over $1,000 in a calendar year … ‘for the 
purpose of … infl uencing’ the nomination or election of any person to federal offi ce.”  Id . at 
62– 63 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 432 (Supp. IV 1970)). 
 8   Id. at 63 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 432 (Supp. IV 1970)). 
 9   Id . 
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of … infl uencing the … election, of any person to Federal offi ce” to fi le a 
statement with the FEC . 10  
 The  Buckley Court began its discussion with an acknowledgment that 
mandatory disclosure “can seriously infringe on privacy of association and 
belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.” 11  This meant that disclosure 
requirements could not be justifi ed “by a mere showing of some legitimate 
governmental interest,” 12  but would have to survive “exacting scrutiny,” which 
required both a suffi ciently important government interest and a substantial 
relationship between the governmental interest and the disclosure require-
ment. 13  The Court then identifi ed three governmental interests that, taken 
together,  did satisfy the “exacting scrutiny” the Constitution required. 14  The 
fi rst has come to be known as the “informational” interest:
 [D] isclosure provides the electorate with information as to where political 
campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate in order 
to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal offi ce. It allows voters 
to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is 
often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches. The 
sources of a candidate’s fi nancial support also alert the voter to the interests 
to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate 
predictions of future performance in offi ce. 15  
 Next, the Court explained that disclosure furthered an important interest in 
preventing both corruption and the appearance of corruption, reasoning that 
“exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity” was 
likely to “discourage those who would use money for improper purposes either 
before or after the election,” 16  as well as to equip the public to detect “any post- 
election special favors that may be given in return.” 17  
 Finally, the Court concluded that disclosure was justifi ed by an “enforce-
ment interest”— that is, that the law’s “recordkeeping, reporting, and 
 10   Id. at 145 (citing 52 U.S.C. § 30101, formerly§ 434(e));  accord Buckley , 424 U.S. at 63– 64. 
  11   Id. at 64. To underscore the signifi cance of this interest, the Court pointed to cases like 
 NAACP v. Alabama , 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1964) (holding that Alabama could not compel the 
state chapter of the NAACP to disclose the names of its staff and members), and  Bates v. Little 
Rock , 361 U.S. 516, 527 (1960) (holding that the City of Little Rock could not demand lists of 
NAACP members and staff). 
 12   Buckley , 424 U.S. at 64. 
 13   Id . (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 14   Id. at 64– 66. 
 15   Id. at 66– 67 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 16   Id. at 67. 
 17   Id . 
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disclosure requirements” were necessary to police compliance with FECA ’s 
other provisions. 18  
 The Court found these interests “suffi ciently important to outweigh the 
possibility of infringement [of First Amendment rights], particularly when the 
‘free functioning of our national institutions’ is involved.” 19  But it left the door 
open to future as- applied challenges, where there was a demonstrated “rea-
sonable probability” that disclosure would result in “threats, harassment, or 
reprisals.” 20  
 In addition to affi rming the availability of as- applied challenges, the Court 
limited the sweep of disclosure requirements in two ways. First, it limited 
the defi nition of  political committee to organizations whose “major purpose 
… is the nomination or election of a candidate.” 21  This meant, among other 
things, that only such entities were subject to the law’s committee disclosure 
requirements. And second, it narrowed the independent- organization dis-
closure requirements to “contributions earmarked for political purposes or 
authorized or requested by a candidate or his agent,” and “expenditures for 
communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly 
identifi ed candidate.” 22  
 The Court cited disclosure requirements in generally approving terms in a 
number of post- Buckley cases. 23  But it was not until the 2003 case  McConnell 
 18   Id . at 67– 68. 
 19   Id. at 66 (quoting Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 97 (1961). 
 20   Id. at 74. This discussion occurred primarily in the context of the Court’s evaluation of the 
argument that a blanket exemption to the disclosure requirements was warranted for inde-
pendent and third- party candidates, but its general interest- balancing analysis has been under-
stood to apply more broadly.  See id. at 72– 74. In  Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign 
Committee , 459 U.S. 87, 102 (1982), the Court found that the Socialist Workers Party  was 
entitled to such an exemption from Ohio’s campaign fi nance disclosure law. 
 21   Buckley , 424 U.S . at 79. 
 22   Id. at 80. The Court tied this limiting defi nition to an earlier defi nition of “express advocacy” 
as involving “express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ 
‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’ ”  Id. at 44 n. 52. 
 23   See, e.g. , Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 223 (1999) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T] otal disclosure has been recognized as the 
essential cornerstone to effective campaign fi nance reform and fundamental to the polit-
ical system.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); FEC v.  Mass. Citizens for 
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986) (invalidating FECA’s independent corporate expenditure 
limitations as applied to a nonprofi t ideological corporation, but also citing with approval the 
disclosure provisions that continued to apply to the plaintiff group, and noting that “[t]hese 
reporting obligations provide precisely the information necessary to monitor MCFL’s inde-
pendent spending activity and its receipt of contributions”); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. 765, 791– 92  & n.  32 (1978) (invalidating Massachusetts’s limitations on corporate 
spending on ballot initiatives, and remarking that “the people in our democracy are entrusted 
with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of confl icting arguments,” 
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822906.007
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Cambridge Uni Press New York, on 10 Dec 2018 at 19:01:07, subject to the Cambridge Core
Disclosure in a Post- Citizens United World 157
157
v. Federal Election Commission that it again addressed disclosure in depth. 24  
The  McConnell Court split 5- 4 on the constitutionality of many of the substan-
tive provisions of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). 25  But 
the Court was nearly unanimous in upholding the law’s expanded disclosure 
requirements. 26  The Court explained that “the important state interests that 
prompted the  Buckley Court to uphold FECA ’s disclosure requirements— 
providing the electorate with information, deterring actual corruption and 
avoiding any appearance thereof, and gathering the data necessary to enforce 
more substantive electioneering restrictions— apply in full to [the disclosure 
requirements created by] BCRA .” 27  
 In three cases in the last eight years, the Court has again reaffi rmed the con-
stitutionality of broad disclosure requirements. In  Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission , which began as a case largely about disclosure, eight 
Justices resoundingly upheld the constitutionality of BCRA ’s expanded dis-
closure requirements, fi nding those requirements plainly justifi ed by the “infor-
mational interest” in disclosure. (Because the Court credited this interest, it 
found no need even to discuss the other government interests that might be 
implicated.) Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that “The First Amendment 
protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to 
react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency 
enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to 
different speakers and messages.” 28  
 Though disclosure was not directly at issue in  McCutcheon v.  Federal 
Election Commision , in which the Court considered the constitutionality of 
the aggregate limits on contributions to candidates and committees, the Court 
in that case went out of its way to reaffi rm that “[d] isclosure of contributions 
minimizes the potential for abuse of the campaign fi nance system … 
and that “[i]dentifi cation of the source of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure, 
so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected”). 
 24   540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 25   Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107– 155, 116 Stat. 81 (codifi ed 
at (codifi ed at 52 U.S.C. § 30101, formerly 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2002)),  invalided in part by Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 26   See McConnell , 540 U.S.  at 190– 92 (opinion of Justices Stevens and O’Connor, joined 
by Justices Souter and Ginsburg) (rejecting challenge to BCRA’s expanded disclosure 
requirements),  id. at 231 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., joined in relevant part by all Justices 
but Thomas) (BCRA’s disclosure provisions bear “a suffi cient relationship” to the important 
governmental interest of “ ‘shed[ding] the light of publicity’ on campaign fi nancing”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 27   540 U.S. at 196. 
 28   Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 370 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
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disclosure … offers a particularly effective means of arming the voting public 
with information.” 29  
 Doe v. Reed , though not a campaign fi nance case, represents the Court’s 
last major foray into disclosure in recent years. 30   Doe involved a referendum 
petition to put to a popular vote a state same- sex domestic partner benefi ts 
bill. Following the signature drive, a number of groups sought access to the 
referendum petitions under the state’s public records law. Both the sponsor 
and certain petition signatories brought a First Amendment challenge to the 
public- records law. Construing the case as a facial challenge, the Court held 
that the law, though it did implicate First Amendment interests, was justifi ed 
by the government’s compelling interest in “preserving the integrity of the 
electoral process.” 31  Justice Antonin Scalia concurred separately, setting forth 
the view, not by its logic limited to the referendum signature context, that 
“[r] equiring people to stand up in public for their political acts fosters civic 
courage, without which democracy is doomed.” 32  
 As this discussion makes clear, a strong majority of the Court has struck 
a remarkably pro- disclosure note in a number of cases, including in recent 
years, making disclosure a noteworthy exception to the strongly deregula-
tory arc of the Roberts Court in campaign fi nance regulation more broadly. 33  
And both state and lower federal courts have followed the Supreme Court’s 
lead, for the most part rejecting challenges to disclosure requirements. But, 
importantly, in  all of the campaign fi nance cases discussed above, disclosure 
challenges have come before the Court paired with challenges to other, more 
substantive forms of campaign fi nance regulation; perhaps for that reason, the 
Court’s disclosure discussions have generally been fairly cursory, often without 
particularly developed reasoning. 34  This means that the constitutional politics 
of disclosure may be less stable than the excerpts above suggest. 35  
 B.  Practice 
 The preceding section walked through the Supreme Court’s major encounters 
with disclosure. But there is a sizable gulf between the Court’s rhetoric when 
 29   McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
 30   561 U.S. 186 (2010). 
 31   Id . at 197. 
 32   Id . at 228 (Scalia , J., concurring). 
 33   Richard L.  Hasen ,  Election Law’s Path in the Roberts Court’s First Decade: A Sharp Right Turn 
but with Speed Bumps and Surprising Twists ,  68  Stan. L. Rev.  1597 ,  1604– 05 ( 2016 ) . 
 34   Katherine  Shaw ,  Taking Disclosure Seriously ,  Yale J.L. & Pol’y Inter Alia  18 ,  19 ( 2016 ) . 
 35   Id . 
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it comes to disclosure, and the on- the- ground reality of our disclosure system. 
Accordingly, this part provides a (necessarily abbreviated) overview of the 
current practice of disclosure, highlighting the ways in which current practice 
fails to align with the Court’s rhetoric. 36  
 1.  Dark Money and Gray Money 
 First, much of the money that fl ows through American elections today is either 
not subject to public disclosure at all (“dark money”), or is disclosed in a way that 
obscures the true sources of election spending (“gray money”). 37  
 For the most part, the term “dark money” refers to money spent on 
elections by social welfare groups organized under section 501(c)(4) of the 
Internal Revenue Code (and to a lesser extent other exempt organizations 
organized under sections 501(c)(5) and 501(c)(6) of the Code— I refer to all 
of these as “social welfare” organizations throughout). Such organizations 
are tax exempt, but, unlike section 501(c)(3) organizations, they are not 
prohibited from engaging in political activity. 38  Rather, the IRS has advised 
that a social welfare organization may engage in political activity “so long as 
that is not its primary activity.” 39  Many such organizations have interpreted 
this guidance to mean that “as long as expenditures on these activities do 
not exceed fi fty percent of the organization’s expenditures … anything goes 
… regardless of the nature of the political activities and whether they are 
in furtherance of the organization’s social welfare purposes.” 40  And, though 
such entities must report their expenditures on an IRS Form 990 as part of 
 36   The picture painted in this section is primarily of the federal system; space limitations pre-
clude any real consideration of the practice in the states. 
 37   LEE ET AL .,  supra  note 1 , at 5. 
 38   Rev. Rul. 81– 95, 1981- 1 C.B. 332 (“In order to qualify for exemption under section 501(c)(4) of 
the Code, an organization must be primarily engaged in activities that promote social welfare. 
Although the promotion of social welfare within the meaning of section 1.501(c)(4)- 1 of the 
regulations does not include political campaign activities, the regulations do not impose a 
complete ban on such activities for section 501(c)(4) organizations. Thus, an organization may 
carry on lawful political activities and remain exempt under section 501(c)(4) as long as it is pri-
marily engaged in activities that promote social welfare”;  see also  Social Welfare Organizations , 
 IRS.Gov ,  www.irs.gov/ charities- non- profi ts/ other- non- profi ts/ social- welfare- organizations .  See 
generally  Terence  Dougherty ,  Section 501(c)(4) Advocacy Organizations: Political Candidate- 
Related and Other Partisan Activities in Furtherance of the Social Welfare ,  36  Seattle U. L. 
Rev.  1337 ( 2013 ) . 
 39   Rev. Rul. 81– 95, 1981- 1 C.B. 332.  See also  Ellen P.  Aprill ,  Political Speech of Noncharitable 
Exempt Organizations after Citizens United ,  10  Election L.J.  363 ,  381 ( 2011 ) . 
 40   Dougherty,  supra  note 38 , at 1339. 
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their annual tax fi lings, contributors to such entities are not made publicly 
available. 41  
 The relevant campaign fi nance statutes do not distinguish between for- 
profi t and non- profi t entities. But they limit meaningful disclosure in two dis-
tinct ways. As to any entity that makes an “independent expenditure” of over 
$250 per year, the law requires the fi ling of certain reports with the FEC . 
But, though federal statutes contain arguably confl icting directives about 
what those reports must contain, 42  the FEC has determined that independent 
spenders must report the identity of contributors  only for contributions “made 
for the purpose of furthering the reported independent expenditure.” 43  Since 
most contributors do not earmark their contributions in any way, under this 
interpretation there is essentially no disclosure of contributor identity. 
 Similarly, in the case of “electioneering”— ads that name a candidate 
without expressly urging any action, like a vote for or against that candidate— 
federal law would  seem to require full disclosure of expenditures and 
contributors above a certain level. A federal statute requires entities that spend 
over $10,000 per year to disclose “names and addresses of all contributors who 
contributed an aggregate amount of $1,000 or more to the person making the 
disbursement” during the election cycle. 44  But an FEC regulation limits such 
disclosure, like independent expenditure disclosure, to contributions made 
“for the purpose of furthering electioneering communications,” 45  so such 
contributors also typically go undisclosed. 
 So the IRS permits tax- exempt organizations to engage in campaign- related 
activity; and the FEC requires the disclosure of contributors only where the 
contributions are specifi cally earmarked for political activity (and they rarely 
are). All of this means that a great deal of outside money is subject to no real 
transparency at all. According to one study, “Dark money ads amounted to 
nearly 14 percent of all ads aired in the 2012 cycle, and 47 percent of all interest 
group ads.” 46  
 The term “gray money” is typically used to refer to the activities of groups 
known as “Super PACs.” These entities cropped up in the wake of the 
 41   The IRS Form 990 requires the inclusion of contributors above $5,000, but such contributors 
are not subject to public disclosure.  See  Instructions for Form 990 Return of Organization 
Exempt From Income Tax ,  IRS.gov ,  www.irs.gov/ pub/ irs- pdf/ i990.pdf ;  see also Aprill,  supra 
 note 39 . 
 42   Compare 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(1)  to 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(2)(C). 
 43   11 C.F.R. § 109.10(e)(1)(vi). 
 44   52 U.S.C. § 30104(f). 
 45   11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9).  See also Van Hollen v. FEC, 811 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 46   Travis N.  Ridout ,  Michael M.  Franz &  Erika Franklin  Fowler ,  Sponsorship, Disclosure, and 
Donors: Limiting the Impact of Outside Group Ads ,  68  Pol. Res. Q.  154 ,  156 ( 2015 ) . 
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decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in  SpeechNow.
org v. Federal Election Commission , which read the logic of  Citizens United 
as condemning limits on contributions to political committees that make 
exclusively independent expenditures. 47  Super PACS, though they can accept 
unlimited contributions under  SpeechNow , are still PACs, which means they 
are required to provide detailed information to the FEC (in contrast to the 
nonprofi ts described in the preceding section). But, importantly, the donors 
whose identities they are required to report are often other entities— including 
501(c)(4) organizations, which can give to PACs and then shield their own 
donors as described above. So Super PAC disclosure, though in theory quite 
robust, frequently provides little meaningful information about the sources of 
PAC funds. 
 2.  Hard Money: Flaws and Limitations 
 So the under- inclusiveness of our system of disclosure is one major problem. 
But even money that  is subject to disclosure— the “hard money” spent by 
campaigns, parties, and regular PACs— suffers from fl aws when it comes to 
the collection of meaningful, high- value information of the sort voters need if 
disclosure is to achieve the objectives the Supreme Court has identifi ed. 
 Federal law requires campaigns and committees to provide the FEC with 
the fi rst and last name, occupation, employer, and address of any individual 
who makes a contribution over $200. Despite this requirement, FEC records 
refl ect a number of problems, which sociologist Jennifer Heerwig has grouped 
into three categories: selective compliance (donors who comply with some 
but not all disclosure requirements— that is, leaving particular fi elds blank); 
the provision of information that is vague (providing one’s occupation as 
“self- employed,” say, or “slumlord” 48  ), and dissimulation (supplying informa-
tion that masks one’s true identity or interests). 49  Perhaps more important, 
under the current disclosure regime it is extraordinarily time- consuming to 
track the activity of particular donors across elections and over periods of 
time. All of this means that FEC records are often far less informative than 
they might be. 
 47   599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 48   See  Eric  Lichtblau ,  White Supremacist Who Infl uenced Charleston Suspect Donated to 2016 
G.O.P. Campaigns ,  N.Y. Times (June 22,  2015 ) ,  www.nytimes.com/ 2015/ 06/ 22/ us/ campaign- 
donations- linked- to- white- supremacist.html . 
 49   Jennifer  Heerwig ,  Diagnosing Disclosure:  A Social Scientifi c Perspective on the Disclosure 
Debate , 34  Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. Inter Alia 8,  10 ( 2016 ) . 
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 3.  Accessibility and Impact 
 To be sure, developments in technology have made information about hard 
money more accessible than ever before. While FEC fi les once needed to 
be reviewed in hard copy, they are now available for anyone with an internet 
connection (though subject to some of the limitations identifi ed above). 
Interested members of the electorate can now use the FEC’s website to access 
information about contributions made by specifi c individuals, as well as to 
view graphics containing information about both congressional and presiden-
tial races. But as a general matter, the data is not presented by the FEC in a 
fashion that facilitates its use by ordinary voters. 
 C.  Empirical Research 
 For many years, disclosure debates unfolded without the benefi t of much 
research on either the costs or the benefi ts of disclosure. 50  Social scientists 
have begun to remedy that state of affairs, though much work remains to be 
done. This part briefl y walks through what the data show with respect to both 
the costs and benefi ts of disclosure. 
 1.  Quantifying Benefi ts 
 Research on the informational benefi ts of campaign fi nance disclosure 
remains limited, but several studies stand out. 51  First, a classic political science 
text by Arthur Lupia assessed the impact of disclosure on voters in a California 
ballot initiative. 52  On the ballot were fi ve distinct propositions, all related to 
car insurance. 53  Three separate interest groups— the insurance industry, trial 
 50   John C.  Fortier &  Michael J.  Malbin ,  An Agenda for Future Research on Money in Politics in the 
United States ,  11  The Forum  455 ,  473 ( 2013 ) (“Current research on disclosure is fairly sparse, 
pointing to contrary results.”).  Cf .  Daniel P.  Tokaji &  Renata E. B.  Strause ,  How Sausage Is 
Made: A Research Agenda for Campaign Finance and Lobbying ,  164  U. Pa. L. Rev. Online 
 223, 228 ( 2016 ) (“Advocates of reform should … set aside the theoretical debate in order to 
engage in an empirical assessment of the effects that present- day independent spending is 
actually having on elections and governance.”). 
 51   I should note that the other interest courts have credited in the disclosure realm— preventing 
corruption and the appearance of corruption— remains essentially untested as an empirical 
matter.  Cf .  Daniel P.  Tokaji  &  Renata E. B.  Strause ,  The New Soft Money: Outside 
Spending in Congressional Elections (2014) (reporting the results of several months of 
interviews with members of Congress, candidates, and staff members, regarding the impact of 
outside spending on campaigns and governance) . 
 52   Arthur  Lupia ,  Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California 
Insurance Reform Elections ,  88  Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.  63 ( 1994 ) . 
 53   Id . at 64. 
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lawyers, and consumer groups— had weighed in to either support or to oppose 
various propositions. The study found that where voters could identify the 
interest group backing a particular proposition, even poorly informed voters 
were able to mirror the decision- making processes of their more well- informed 
peers. 54  This means, the author concluded, that, at least in the ballot- initiative 
context, information about the sources of support may provide voters with 
valuable data they can then use to cast better- informed votes. 55  
 More recently, fi ndings from a 2013 experimental study by political scien-
tist Michael Sances suggest that disclosure about political money can supply 
voters with a useful guide to candidate ideology. 56  Participants in Sances ’ 
study were shown an edited political ad in support of a candidate. The ad 
discussed job creation, typically a non- partisan issue, and made no mention 
of political party. 57  Some participants were also shown a disclaimer indicating 
that a fi ctional organization, “Americans for Change,” was responsible for the 
advertisement. 58  Two groups were also shown text that purported to list the top 
contributors to “Americans for Change”: one, the “Labor Disclosure” group, 
was shown a list of fi ve labor unions; the other, the “Business Disclosure” 
group, was shown a list of fi ve corporations. 59  Participants were then asked 
how likely they were to vote for the candidate. Compared to subjects who were 
not provided disclosures listing the top contributors to the fi ctional organiza-
tion, Republican subjects were signifi cantly less likely to register support for 
the candidate when shown the labor contributors; Democratic subjects were 
less likely to indicate support for the candidate when informed that the top 
contributors were corporations. 60  
 In another recent piece, Conor Dowling and Amber Wichowsky similarly 
attempted to test the effects of disclosure by assessing whether, and how, dis-
closing the funders of political messages might impact the effectiveness of 
those messages (here, negative or “attack” ads). In one experiment, the authors 
found that where participants were shown an attack ad alone, that ad tended 
to erode support for the candidate being attacked;  but where participants were 
also provided with information about the donors to the entity responsible 
for the ad— in this instance the group American Crossroads — the disclosure 
 54   Id . at 72. 
 55   Id . 
 56   Michael W.  Sances ,  Is Money in Politics Harming Trust in Government? Evidence From Two 
Survey Experiments ,  12  Election L.J.  53 ,  54 ( 2013 ) . 
 57   Id . at 56. 
 58   Id . at 56. 
 59   Id . at 56– 57. 
 60   Id . at 57– 59. 
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moved “aggregate opinion roughly back to where it would have been had 
participants not watched the ad in the fi rst place.” 61  Those fi ndings were 
confi rmed by another, similar study by Travis Ridout , Michael Franz and 
Erika Fowler ; though its fi ndings were more complex, the authors concluded 
that information about the contributors to the group responsible for an attack 
ad had, in some cases, a signifi cant impact on the perceived credibility of the 
ad, and thus its effectiveness. 62  And a recent piece by Abby Wood suggests that 
the informational benefi ts of disclosure may include supplying voters with 
high- value information about candidate positions on transparency itself. 63  
 Taken together, these pieces suggest that individuals  do utilize informa-
tion about the sources of support in elections (whether candidate elections or 
ballot initiatives). But it is clear, from these studies and others, that the form in 
which the information is presented is of paramount importance. For example, 
another fi nding of the Dowling and Wichowsky study discussed above is that 
where individuals learned about the supporters of particular ads by reading 
news accounts, rather than via some other mechanism, that information had 
no impact on viewers’ reactions to the ad. 64  This is consistent with a fi nding 
by David Primo — that mock newspaper articles containing disclosure infor-
mation had no statistically signifi cant impact on voters’ ability to identify the 
positions of interest groups on a ballot issue. 65  
 2.  Evaluating Costs 
 So disclosure does appear, from the limited empirical work on the topic, to 
provide voters with informational benefi ts (though the form of disclosure 
matters). But what about the other side of the equation? Does disclosure 
 61   Conor M.  Dowling &  Amber  Wichowsky ,  Does It Matter Who’s Behind the Curtain? 
Anonymity in Political Advertising and the Effects of Campaign Finance Disclosure ,  41  Am. 
Pol. Res.  965 ,  978 ( 2013 ) . 
 62   Ridout et al.,  supra  note 46 . The impact of the particular disclosure varied signifi cantly— infor-
mation that an unknown entity was responsible for an attack ad made the ad more effective 
than it would have been had the opposing candidate been responsible, but information that 
even a small grass- roots group was responsible for the ad made the ad  less credible than if there 
had been no disclosure at all. 
 63   Abby K.  Wood ,  Campaign Finance Disclosure and Voter Competence , Working Paper (on 
fi le with author) . 
 64   Dowling & Wichowsky,  supra  note 62 , at 981 (“[W] hile identifying the top fi ve donors in a table 
format resulted in participants being more supportive of the attacked candidate compared to 
only viewing the ad, we fi nd no statistically signifi cant evidence that reading a news article 
discussing the donors to American Crossroads moved opinion”). 
 65   David M.  Primo ,  Information at the Margin:  Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, Ballot 
Issues, and Voter Knowledge ,  12  Election L.J.  112 ,  114 ,  126– 27 ( 2013 ) . 
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impose serious costs— in particular, does it deter individuals from giving pol-
itical money, as some have assumed? 66  To date, there is no real support for the 
proposition that disclosure acts as a  major deterrent to political contributions, 
though some scholarship confi rms the hypothesis that mandatory disclosure 
will have at least some deterrent effect. 
 Political scientist Ray La Raja , noting that we currently lack both “a the-
oretical framework and empirical research” 67  for evaluating the costs and 
benefi ts of disclosure, recently reported the fi ndings of an experimental study 
designed to determine whether potential donors were deterred from giving 
by the prospect of publicity. 68  His results were mixed: although the prospect 
of public disclosure had little to no impact on would- be donors’ willingness 
to make contributions, 69  information about specifi c thresholds above which 
contributions would be publicized  did result in smaller overall contributions. 70  
And, signifi cantly, individuals who faced “strong interpersonal cross- pressures 
from people around them” 71  — that is, those who reported that they were not 
surrounded by like-minded individuals— were found to be “most likely to 
stop giving or donate at considerably smaller amounts to avoid the threshold 
amount,” 72  likely because they feared the social or other costs that might result 
from revealing their political preferences. 
 An even more recent piece by Abby Wood and Douglas Spencer relied on 
reported state- level contribution data across states that both did and did not 
expand state- level disclosure requirements over the period of the study. Wood 
and Spencer found that contributors were “only slightly less likely to con-
tribute in future elections in states that increase the public visibility of cam-
paign contributions, relative to contributors in states that do not change their 
disclosure laws or practices over the same time period,” and noted that for the 
most part these changes in contribution behavior were negligible. 73  
 66   See, e.g ., Van Hollen v. FEC, 811 F.3d 486, 488 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Disclosure chills speech”); 
 Michael  Gilbert ,  Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information Tradeoff ,  98  Iowa L. Rev. 
 1847 ,  1849 ( 2013 ) (arguing that in addition to its informational benefi ts, disclosure can actually 
“chill speech”). 
 67   Ray J.  La Raja ,  Political Participation and Civic Courage: The Negative Effect of Transparency 
on Making Small Campaign Contributions ,  36  Pol. Behav.  753 ,  754 ( 2014 ) . 
 68   Id . at 755. 
 69   Id . at 762. 
 70   Id . at 768. 
 71   Id . at 770. 
 72   Id . at 770. 
 73   Abby K.  Wood &  Douglas M.  Spencer ,  In the Shadows of Sunlight: The Effects of Transparency 
on State Political Campaigns  15  Election L.J.  302 ,  311 ( 2016 ) (estimating one “chilled” donor 
per candidate). 
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 Beyond this scholarly work, both case law and the popular press make clear 
that the targeting of individuals for harassment or retaliation based on dis-
closure of political contributions does occur. In  Brown v.  Socialist Workers 
’74 Campaign Committee , 74  the Court sustained a minor party’s as- applied 
challenge to compelled disclosure, citing “numerous instances of recent har-
assment” by both private parties and the government. 75  More recently, in 
the course of considering a challenge to the broadcasting of the trial over 
California’s Proposition 8, the 2008 ballot initiative in which California voters 
amended their state’s constitution to recognize “only marriage between a man 
and a woman,” the Court noted allegations of harassment, including death 
threats and vandalism, against Proposition 8’s supporters. 76  And press accounts 
suggest that Mozilla CEO Brendan Eich resigned after his fi nancial support 
for Proposition 8 was made public. 77  But neither the prevalence of this sort 
of activity, nor its impact on the behavior of active or prospective donors, is 
yet clear. 
 III.  Making Disclosure Work 
 The preceding sections surveyed the current disclosure landscape. In this 
section, I make a number of recommendations, ranging from the practical to 
the theoretical, for improving this important and underappreciated element 
of our system of campaign fi nance regulation. I am guided in this effort by 
a succinct summation offered by Michael Malbin and Thomas Gais two 
decades ago. Campaign fi nance disclosure can only work, they wrote, if: 
“(1) Most candidates and political organizations report what they do accur-
ately; (2) Such reports in fact comprise most of the activities and relationships 
of importance to voters; (3) The reports are available in a useful format, and 
at an accessible location; (4) Interested, knowledgeable people read and inter-
pret the reports and then make useful information available in a timely way 
to voters; (5) Voters are able and willing to use the information as a basis for 
making an election decision.” 78  The recommendations offered below would 
bring us signifi cantly closer to achieving these objectives. 
 74   459 U.S. 87 (1982). 
 75   Id . at 100– 1. 
 76   Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705, 707 (2010) (per curiam). 
 77   Alistair  Barr ,  Mozilla CEO Brendan Eich Steps Down: Attention Focused on his Support of 
Anti- Gay Marriage Ballot Proposal ,  Wall St. J . ( Apr. 3,  2014 ) . 
 78   Michael  Malbin  &  Thomas L .  Gais ,  The Day After Reform: Sobering Campaign 
Finance Lessons from the States  36 ( 1998 ) . 
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 A.  Expanding Disclosure 
 One obvious gap in the current system is the amount of political money that is 
currently not subject to meaningful disclosure. Several fi xes are possible here. 
First, the IRS could limit the ability of social welfare organizations to engage 
in political activity. Even if it did not ban such activity outright, as it does with 
501(c)(3) charitable organizations, 79  it might impose a much stricter limit than 
it currently allows; Ellen Aprill has suggested that such organizations might 
appropriately be limited to devoting 10– 15 percent of their total activities to 
politicking rather than the  de facto 50  percent ceiling that is currently in 
effect. 80  Alternatively, it could make public the information it already collects 
from social welfare organization via IRS Form 990; since those entities are 
already required to report contributions above $5,000, it would be a simple fi x 
to make such information publicly available. 81  
 But a far better solution would be to bring all entities that engage in 
election- related spending under the same disclosure regime— and, short of 
the creation of a new entity, the best organization to oversee all disclosure 
would be the FEC . One way to achieve this would be to expand the def-
inition of a PAC in order to sweep in all entities that engage in campaign 
spending. This could be challenging: notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s 
general approval of disclosure, the Court has evidenced some concern about 
what it perceives as the burdens posed by the requirements of the PAC form. 
Justice Kennedy ’s majority opinion in  Citizens United , in rejecting the argu-
ment that the option to speak through a PAC mitigated any constitutional 
concerns about the corporate speech limitation, wrote that “PACs are bur-
densome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and subject to exten-
sive regulations.” 82  But, critically, that statement was made in the context of 
a discussion that was predicated on the existence of meaningful disclosure by 
non- PAC entities. In light of the obvious shortcomings of that assumption, 
 79   In theory, the IRS could go further by simply aligning the standards of the tax exempt 
organizations that currently engage in political activity with 501(c)(3)s— in other words, by 
prohibiting social welfare organizations from engaging in any political activity at all. The 
Court explained in  Regan v. Taxation without Representation , 461 U.S. 540, 545– 46 (1983), that 
the government has no obligation to subsidize political activities, like lobbying, by nonprofi t 
organizations. But in the post- Citizens United era, it is not clear that a categorical ban of this 
sort would pass constitutional muster.  See  Brian  Galle ,  Charities in Politics: A Reappraisal ,  54 
 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.  1561 ( 2013 ) . 
 80   Aprill,  supra  note 39 , at 382. 
 81   Such information already appears on Schedule B of IRS Form 990.  See id. at 403– 4 & n. 327. 
 82   Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010). 
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the Court could well come to a different conclusion about the permissibility 
of imposing PAC- like requirements on all independent campaign spenders. 83  
 Three other possibilities bear mentioning. First, a movement has cropped 
up in recent years to use the Securities and Exchange Commission to require 
public companies to provide shareholders with information about campaign 
spending. 84  Second, at least one academic proposal suggests that the Federal 
Communications Commission could use existing authorities to require inde-
pendent spenders to engage in disclosure as a condition of the purchase of 
advertising airtime. 85  Third, state nonprofi t law may be another site of possible 
reform, and states like California have already begun requiring nonprofi ts that 
engage in political activity to provide the state with information about the 
sources of their contributions. 86  But these proposals, though constructive, are 
limited in scope; they would also result in the addition of new government 
entities as well as new sites of information to the regulatory mix. 
 B.  Improving Disclosure 
 Several simple fi xes to our hard- money system could signifi cantly improve the 
quality of campaign- fi nance data on what is still the most important source of 
money in federal elections. 87  First, the use of standardized forms at the FEC , 
perhaps with drop- down menus of the sort used in the Census long form, would 
facilitate the provision of more useful information, and eliminate the prospect 
of evasive or non- responsive answers. Second, donors should be given unique 
ID numbers, which would facilitate identifi cation— by scholars, journalists, 
and interested and engaged voters— of the largest and most signifi cant donors. 
 83   Cf .  Marcia  Coyle ,  Justice Anthony Kennedy Loathes the Term Swing Vote ,  Nat’l L.J. 
(Oct.  27,  2015 ),  www.nationallawjournal.com/ id=1202740827841/ Justice- Anthony- Kennedy- 
 Loathes- the- Term- Swing- Vote?slreturn=20160905224907 . 
 84   Lucian A.  Bebchuk &  Robert J.  Jackson ,  Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending ,  101 
 Geo L.J.  923 ,  925 ( 2013 ) (arguing that “the SEC should develop rules requiring public com-
panies to disclose political spending to shareholders”). 
 85   Lili  Levi ,  Plan B for Campaign- Finance Reform: Can the FCC Help Save American Politics 
After Citizens United? ,  61  Cath. U.  L. Rev.  97 ,  101 ( 2011 ) (arguing that the FCC can use 
existing authority “to require third- party purchasers of airtime for political and advocacy 
advertising to disclose their major direct and indirect funding sources and principal directors, 
offi cers, or operators”). 
 86   See  Linda  Sugin ,  Politics, Disclosure, and State Law Solutions for 501(c)(4) Organizations ,  91 
 Chi.- Kent. L. Rev.  895 ( 2016 ) . 
 87   Jennifer Heerwig,  supra  note 49 , at 10 (2016).  See also  Races in Which Outside Spending 
Exceeds Candidate Spending, 2014 Election Cycle ,  Center for Responsive 
Politics ,  www.opensecrets.org/ outsidespending/ outvscand.php?cycle=2014 (showing that in 
the 2014 congressional campaigns, outside groups outspent candidates in 28 races, but that 
candidates spent more in the remaining 443) . 
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These two simple fi xes would considerably improve the quality of data the 
FEC collects and maintains. 
 C.  Delivering Disclosure 
 The FEC has made signifi cant strides in making its data publicly available 
in recent years, including the very recent launch of a more interactive web 
portal. But a still more effective disclosure regime would allow voters to use 
the FEC’s website to explore the vectors of political infl uence— perhaps, for 
example, by showing voters how much money a particular offi cial has received 
from high- dollar contributors, or the industries or sectors from which most 
donations to a particular candidate come. 
 Even a vastly improved FEC website, however, would have limited impact, 
as only a small subset of the electorate engages directly with such data. If dis-
closure is actually to impact the behavior of voters, it needs to be presented 
to voters at a time and in a format that could actually affect voting behavior. 
Although American citizens are not going to become perfectly informed voters 
anytime soon, individuals with limited information are certainly capable of 
making informed choices. 88  The challenge, then, is how best to provide voters 
with information that might empower and enable them to do that. 
 Archon Fung , Mary Graham , and David Weil , the authors of the seminal text 
 Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency , 89  describe restaurant- 
hygiene disclosure as a paradigmatic example of successful disclosure. As they 
explain, hygiene grades (“A,” “B,” “C”), typically posted in restaurant windows, 
“have become highly embedded in customers’ … decisional processes. 
A restaurant’s grade is available  when users need it …  where they need it … and 
in a  format that makes complex information quickly comprehensible.” 90  
 How, then, to deliver campaign fi nance information to voters in a way that 
mirrors what is so effective about restaurant sanitation grades? Disclaimers, 
 88   See Elizabeth  Garrett &  Daniel A.  Smith ,  Veiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure 
Laws in Direct Democracy ,  4  Election L.J.  295 ,  296 ( 2005 ) (“No voter needs to acquire all 
available information to competently make a reasoned decision. Instead, she can rely on par-
ticular pieces of information, connected non- accidentally to accurate conclusions about the 
consequences of her vote, and still vote competently.”) 
 89   Archon  Fung ,  Mary  Graham  &  David  Weil ,  Full Disclosure:  The Perils and 
Promise of Transparency ( 2007 ) . Specifi cally, they write, “Successful policies focus fi rst 
on the needs and interests of information users, as well as their abilities to comprehend 
the information provided by the system.…They seek to embed new facts in the decision- 
making routines of information users and to embed user responses in the decision making of 
disclosers,”  Id . at 11. 
 90   Id. at  83 . 
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which appear as part of political advertisements, are one obvious site of poten-
tial reform. At present, a provision of federal law upheld in  Citizens United 
requires independent spenders to include in their ads disclaimers that read “_ _ 
_ _ is responsible for the content of this advertising,” both spoken and displayed 
on the screen for at least four seconds. 91  (Candidates’ own ads are subject to 
similar requirements. 92  ) But because such entities typically use names that are 
benign, patriotic- sounding, and generally uninformative, 93  the disclosed infor-
mation does not ordinarily communicate much of value. 
 Justin Levitt has proposed the creation of a “Democracy Facts” label to 
appear within campaign communications, “emphasizing simple proxies for 
the quantity and fervor of local support for a particular communication,” 
including the number of supporters in a given jurisdiction, as well as the per-
centage of support supplied by top donors. 94  This sort of detail could make 
disclaimers more genuinely informative. Another possibility would be to 
require organizations to craft a mission or policy statement for inclusion in 
their disclaimers. As research like the Lupia study described above shows, 
information about the supporters of particular causes and messages  can equip 
voters to make choices that better align with their preferences. Of course, 
choosing between two or more candidates is quite distinct from the decision 
about where to eat dinner. But the general point— that information should be 
delivered near in time to voting and in an accessible format— seems entirely 
applicable. 
 D.  Testing and Theorizing Disclosure 
 Another important task is more academic:  the need to engage in add-
itional empirical research on how best to design and deliver disclosure, and, 
relatedly, to develop a more fully realized set of arguments that emphasize 
the constitutional values advanced by disclosure. As a number of scholars 
have noted, 95  in the post- Citizens United era, opponents of campaign fi nance 
regulation have begun to focus on challenging the premises of disclosure 
  91   2 U.S.C. § 441d(d)(1)(B) (2002). 
  92   Citizens United , 530 F. Supp.  2d at 280 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a)(3) (2002)). The law also 
requires the sponsors of ads to provide in the disclaimers identifying information that includes 
the name, address, and phone number or website of the sponsor. 
  93   Heerwig & Shaw,  supra  note 2 , at 1496. 
 94   Justin  Levitt ,  Confronting the Impact of Citizens United ,  29  Yale L. & Pol’y Rev.  217 ,  227– 28 
( 2010 ) . For a visual representation of Levitt’s “Democracy Facts,” see  http:// electionlawblog 
.org/ archives/ DemocracyFacts.html . 
 95   Michael  Kang ,  Campaign Disclosure in Direct Democracy ,  97  Minn. L. Rev.  1700 ,  1700  ( 2013 ) 
(“ [C] ampaign disclosure laws now are under legal and political attack as never before. ”). 
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laws; 96  meanwhile, the affi rmative case for disclosure has lagged behind. Establi-
shing a solid theoretical and empirical framework is critical both to designing 
better disclosure and to successfully defending disclosure against attack. 97  
 E.  Taking Privacy Seriously 
 Finally, any attempts to improve disclosure along the lines described above 
should take seriously the privacy concerns disclosure implicates. 98  One way 
to address privacy concerns is to explore partially de- identifying campaign 
fi nance data before public release. Bruce Cain has written in favor of what he 
calls “semi- disclosure”; 99  noting that the government already employs a kind of 
semi- disclosure in the case of the census, aggregating identifying information 
to avoid revealing sensitive personal details, he suggests that we ought to do 
the same with campaign fi nance data. This insight has a defi nite appeal; at the 
very least, in the internet age, the benefi ts of requiring donors to supply a phys-
ical address seems outweighed by the potential privacy threats represented by 
the availability of such information online. One additional possibility is the 
creation of a tiered system in which data about small donors are available only 
in the aggregate, while the identity of donors above a certain threshold, which 
is of additional informational value, would be revealed. 100  
 IV.  Conclusion 
 For many years, disclosure has played a largely ancillary role in debates about 
money in politics. But any serious reform proposal today should include 
disclosure— both because it has genuine potential for improving our democracy, 
and because a functioning system of disclosure may well be a necessary predi-
cate to building the case for other sorts of substantive campaign fi nance reform. 
  96   See, e.g .,  Bradley A.  Smith ,  Scott  Blackburn &  Luke  Wachob ,  Compulsory Donor 
Disclosure:  When Government Monitors its Citizens ,  www.heritage.org/ research/ reports/ 
2015/ 11/ compulsory- donor- disclosure- when- government- monitors- its- citizens ;  Cleta  Mitchell , 
 Donor Disclosure:  Undermining the First Amendment,  96  Minn. L.  Rev.  1755 ,  1759 ( 2012 ) 
(“Disclosure is the next frontier for those of us who toil in these vineyards— it will constitute 
the next wave of legal jurisprudence in the campaign fi nance arena. In the same way litigants 
challenged these substantive prohibitions on certain kinds of speech, over time we have to 
make the case and build a record about the threat posed by disclosure.”). 
  97   Abby Wood has compiled an excellent list of possible directions for future empirical work.  See 
Wood,  supra  note 63 , at 14– 15. 
  98   See McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (holding that Ohio prohibition 
on anonymous pamphleteering fails to satisfy exacting scrutiny). 
  99   Bruce  Cain ,  Shade from the Glare: The Case for Semi- Disclosure ,  Cato Unbound (Nov. 8, 
 2010 ) ,  www.cato- unbound.org/ 2010/ 11/ 08/ bruce- cain/ shade- glare- case- semi- disclosure . 
 100   Heerwig & Shaw,  supra  note 2 , at 1494. 
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